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earlier philosophers in defense of animals are either
ignored or summarily dismissed in most recent
historical accounts of the growth of human concern for
nonhuman species. In particular, this prejudice of
contemporary moral philosophers has caused the
sometimes profound arguments on the duties of human
beings toward other species that appear in certain Greek
writers to be largely overlooked. 3 While it would be
absurdly anachronistic to maintain that a philosophy of
"animal rights" in a modem sense of that phrase can be
traced to classical culture, a concern for the welfare of
animals is clearly in evidence in some ancient writers
whose arguments in defense of animals at times reveal
striking foreshadowings of those developed in
contemporary philosophical inquiries into the moral
status of animals. This study examines an anticipation,
in the animal-related treatises of Plutarch, in particular
in his De sollenia animalium (On the Cleverness of
Animals), of one of the more controversial arguments
marshalled today in defense of animals, that which is
commonly termed the argument from marginal cases. 4
This argument maintains that it is wrong for humans to
exploit animals in the belief that only humans are
capable of mtionality or feeling or perhaps the use of
language. These capabilities are not in fact possessed
to the same degree by all humans, including, for
example, such "marginal cases" as infants, the mentally
feeble, or perhaps the severely physically handicapped.

In 1965, English novelist and essayist Brigid Brophy
published an article in the London Sunday Times that
would exercise a profound influence on the crusade for
better treatment of animals in Britain and the United
States. In this brief article, entitled simply "The Rights
of Animals," Brophy touched upon a number of points
that were to become central to the arguments in defense
of animals formulated by subsequent representatives
of the animal rights movement.! Indeed, Richard D.
Ryder, one of the most prominent historians of the
movement, judges Brophy's article to have been
instrumental in inspiring the rebirth of interest in this
issue after decades, if not centuries, of neglect and
indifference. Ryder considers the resurgence of interest
in the status of animals in the 1960's, as exemplified by
Brophy's article, to be a corollary to the anti-sexism
and anti-racism crusades of that period as well as an
expression of the return-to-nature philosophy of the
hippie culture of that decade? What impresses one in
accounts like that of Ryder is the persistent tendency of
animal rights advocates to regard a serious concern for
the lot of animals as a distinctly modem phenomenon
whose philosophical position was formulated only in
the past few decades, while arguments put forward by
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natura ferarum, in quibus inesse fortitudinem saepe
dicimus, ut in equis, in leonibus, iustitiam, aequitatem,
bonitatem non dicimus; sunt enim rationis et orationis
expertes. ("In no respect are we further removed from

Conversely, science daily furnishes new evidence that
at least some species of animals have such capabilities
in a higher degree than do the marginal cases of
humans. 5 If one were to lower the standards of human
consideration to protect the rights of all sentient humans,
that is, all humans capable of feeling pain, one would
still have to protect the rights of many animals who
certainly possess such sentience, at least to the degree
that do marginal humans. One does not normally deny
that marginal humans possess such basic rights as the
right to life. Consequently, one cannot justly deny to
animals who possess the capabilities of marginal
humans those rights that are normally accorded to such
classes of humans.6
In three treatises included in his Moralia, Plutarch
set forth his position on the proper treatment owed by
humans to animal creation? The longest and most
carefully argued of these, the dialogue De sollertia
animalium, explores the question of whether landdwelling or sea-dwelling creatures are more clever. No
conclusion is reached, and one has the impression that
Plutarch means to suggest that both types are equally
intelligent. The incomplete treatise De esu carnium (On
the Eating of Flesh) presents a case for vegetarianism
on moral and hygienic grounds. 8 Finally, the brief
dialogue Bruta animalia ratione uti (That Beasts Are
Rational), also known as Gryllus ('Porker') from the
name of one of the interlocutors, envisions a visit by
Odysseus to one of Circe's pig-converts who declines
the hero's offer to persuade the witch to reconvert him
to human form, on the grounds that animals are in all
respects superior to humans, possessing every virtue
of humans but none of their lusts and excesses. 9 While
these three treatises differ widely in technique and
mood, there runs through them a common theme: that
animals are both sentient and rational, and because of
that fact, humans have no justification for mistreating
or exploiting them.
Plutarch's attempt to prove the rationality of animals
was motivated by his desire to counter the Stoic position
that animals cannot reason and therefore do not merit
human concern. lO It was impossible, according to the
Stoics, for human beings to act unjustly toward creatures
that do not understand morality and therefore cannot
share the values of human beings. In his survey of the
Stoic ethical system, Cicero specifically mentions the
alleged lack of rationality in animals that formed the
cornerstone of the Stoic case against them (De officiis
[On Duties] 1.50): neque ulla re longius absumus a
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beasts, in whom we often say that there is courage, as
in the case of horses or lions; but we do not say that
there is in them justice, equity or goodness; for they
are without reason and speeCh").ll Cicero also informs
us that the Stoic Chrysippus denied the possibility of
justice between humans and animals (De finibus [On

Moral Ends] 3. 67): sed quomodo hominum inter
homines iuris esse vincula putant [Stoici], sic homini
nihil iuris esse cum bestiis. praeclare enim Chrysippus
cetera nata esse hominum causa et deorum, eos autem
communitatis et societatis suae, ut bestiis homines uti
ad utilitatem suampossint sine iniuria. ("B ut in the same
way as [the Stoics] think that there exist the bonds of
right between men and men, so do they feel there is no
bond of right with the beasts. For Chrysippus has well
observed that other things were born for the sake of
men and gods, while men and gods exist for their own
society and fellowship, so that men may use beasts for
their advantage without injustice").
According to Stoic teaching, the irrationality of
animals was a consequence of the defective nature of
the animal soul. While it is clear from the extant
fragments of Chrysippus that the Stoics were willing
to allow that animals have souls that are in some
particulars not unlike those of human beings,12 they
detected a flaw in the animal soul that ultimately
prevented animals from rising above merely instinctual
behaviors. The Stoics isolated eight parts of both the
human and the animal soul, the eighth part of which
they termed the "governing principle." This sends out
currents of breath, from the heart to the rest of the human
or animal body that lead to impulses and other sorts of
behaviors. According to the Stoics, animal behaviors
consist exclusively of impulses that may be considered
self-interested, or well-disposed only to the animals
themselves. Animals consequently make decisions that
benefit only themselves, such as tlle quest for food or
the avoidance of pain. 13 While human beings have at
birth a soul not unlike that of the animal, the human
soul in time demonstrates reason, which allows humans
to rise above self-interested behaviors and to have
concern for other rational creatures. Since animals
cannot rise to the level at which tlley can become aware
of moral duty toward other rational creatures, humans
cannot have duties toward them. 14
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Plutarch countered this Stoic assertion of the
irrationality of animals, with its important consequences
for the Stoic denial of the need for human concern for
animals, by noting, among other things, that the Stoics
had in fact made no effort to prove their assertion, with
which other philosophers would not agree (De sollertia
animalium 964C): "How is it right for them to assert
that in their discussion about animals and justice, when
it is neither generally accepted nor otherwise proven?"15
To refute the Stoic position, Plutarch cites, throughout
his three animal-related treatises, examples of animal
behaviors that seem to argue for rationality in animals.
His examples are derived in large part from such works
as Aristotle's Historia animalium (History ofAnimals)
and De generatione animalium (Generation of
Animals), the now-lost zoological treatises of
Tbeophrastus, and the dialogues of Plato, and sourcehunting critics have often observed that his examples
are mere commonplaces drawn from the stockpile of
the sometime naive reflections of Greek natural
philosophy that do not suggest personal study on
Plutarch's part. 16 For example, both his observation that
the mongoose covers its body in mud to protect itself
from the bite of its enemy the crocodile (De sollertia
animalium 966D), and his anecdote that an aged and
"retired" mule was once known to have encouraged
younger mules in their labors (De sollertia animalium
970B), are derived from Aristotle's Historia animalium
(612A and 477B). Yet the mere identification of
Plutarch's sources overlooks the fact that a significant
number of Plutarch's examples are chosen to develop
his thesis that in some aspects of intelligence, demeanor
and character, animals equal or outstrip human beings,
a proposition that is, at least in part, implicit in the
argument from marginal cases. This idea is set forth at
length in a light-hearted fashion by the pig-philosopher
Gryllus in the dialogue of that name. The thoughtful
pig observes, for example, that animals are more just
than are human beings, for they never seek to enslave
other animals (987B), and he argues that animals exceed
humans in courage, since while male and female
animals fight equally fiercely, female humans seek to
avoid battle (987F-988A). Moreover, animal intelligence (991D) in some respects exceeds that of humans
because animals have from birth all skills needed for a
successful life, while humans must cultivate their
intelligence to guide them in a useful direction. Finally,
animals more frequently display temperance than do
humans, for animals are far less likely to overeat than
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humans, and do not seek luxurious housing or other
possessions as do humans (989B-F). Gryllus ends his
catalogue of animal excellences by stating his
amazement that he had ever allowed himself to be
convinced when human that only humans possess
reason and sensation (992C): "Having entered into this
body, I am amazed at the arguments by which I was
convinced by the sophists to think tllat all creatures
excepting man are without reason and sense." By
"sophists," Gryllus probably means the Stoics, against
whom the entire dialogue is directed. Plutarch uses a
similarargument from animal perception and intelligence
to oppose the eating ofmeat in the treatise De esu carnium
(997E), where he praises Pythagoras and Empedocles
for enjoining humans to avoid eating animals. 17
.
The treatise De sollertia animalium presents
Plutarch's most elaborate defense of the proposition
that animals can reason and have sentience. Before
the interlocutors Aristotimus and Phaedimus offer a
lengthy catalogue of examples of animal rationality
(966B-985D), their friends Soclarus and Autobulus
set forth some theoretical considerations on animal
rationality (960B-961F) that lead to Plutarch's
anticipation of the argument from marginal cases
(962A-D). Autobulus observes that that which is
irrational is soulless while that which has a soul is
sentient, and even the Stoics do not deny that animals
have souls (96OC-D). He mentions approvingly a work
by the Peripatetic Strato in which that philosopher had
demonstrated that it is impossible for any creature to
have sensation without some degree of intellectual
activity (961 A), and he delights in catching up the
Stoics in a self-contradiction. I 8 Why, he asks (961D),
do they bother to punish their dogs and horses if not
because they expect them to alter their behavior, which
is only possible if the creatures can reflect on the
purpose of their chastisement? They seek thereby to
create in their animals a feeling of repentance, which,
as the Greek word implies, entails reflection.
While he is tempted to accept Autobulus' arguments
on animal rationality, Soclarus states that he still
considers it the principal failing of animals, among their
many other shortcomings, that they do not purposefully
aim toward virtue, which is the proper activity ofrea'>on.
He confesses himself at a loss as to why nature would
have given the beginnings of reason to creatures that
cannot demonstrate the absolute fullness of reason
(962A): "On examining their many other failings, I note
that of virtue, toward which reason itself exists; nor do
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I observe clear progress toward it, nor inclination. I am
at a loss as to how nature gave them the beginning of it,
when they could not arrive at its perfection."
In his reply to Soclarus, Autobulus posits a situation
in which the claims of animals to fair consideration by
humans are defended by analogy with the claims of a
''marginal'' class of humans, namely slaves. He observes
that those who see no difference between the virtue of
a Socrates or a Plato and that of a slave would likewise
fail to see that the virtue of an animal is imperfect rather
than nonexistent (962B):"But look at this too: is it not
ridiculous to keep saying that persons like Socrates and
Plato take part in vice no less evil than does any slave,
and that they are just as foolish and intemperate and
unjust, and at the same time to criticize the impure and
imperfect virtue of animals as absence of virtue and
not as its weakness and lack of perfection?" In
Autobulus' view, one may speak of degrees of virtue,
and these degrees are directly proportional to the
reasoning capacities of the individuals in question.
Certain classes of living things are not by nature
designed to receive perfect reason nor, in consequence,
to exhibit perfect virtue, but it is not correct, in his view,
to conclude that those creatures who do not possess
perfect reason do not possess reason at all, for every
living creature possesses reason (962C): "There is a
portion of reason in aliliving creatures." While animals,
like slaves, fall into the class of those who are not born
to receive perfect reason, yet both have some reason
and therefore some virtue. What distinguishes a slave
from a Socrates, or an animal from a human being, is
the degree to which that innate reason is cultivated
through training and education (962C): "For reason is
inborn from nature, but genuine and complete reason
arises from practice and education." Such training and
education lie outside the experience of a slave or of an
animal, and the virtue of each must remain rudimentary.
Yet a slave, even if he can never be a Socrates, has
some claim on human sympathy since he shares to some
degree the virtue of a Socrates because he can reason
to some degree. Not every rational creature, after all,
has the perfection of every virtue (962D): "Hence not
every creature endowed with reason has to the same
degree the perfection of mental acuity and sharpness."
Likewise an animal shares in the reason that a slave
possesses, since all living things are born with some
reason, as Plutarch has been at pains to show throughout
his animal-related treatises and has allowed even the
somewhat skeptical Soclarus to acknowledge at the
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beginning of the passage under discussion here (962A).
If an animal possesses some reason, then it would seem
to be entitled to the same consideration that must be
accorded to the slave.
While Plutarch stops short here of specifying what
constitutes the consideration that ought to be shown to
a slave, and, in consequence, to animals, since they
have a share of rationality in Plutarch's view, he
enunciates the belief in a famous passage of his
biography of the Roman statesman Cato the Elder, that
at least kindness is owed to slaves. Moreover, he
specifically links the necessity of showing kindness to
slaves to a necessity of showing it to animals as well.
When censuring Cato for selling off his old slaves when
they were too old to be profitable, he remarks (Cato
Maior 339) that he considers it the mark of a very harsh
character to see no other tie between man and man than
that of usefulness. Beneficence and kindness flow from
a gentle heart, even to animals, and a good man will
take care of his animals as of his worn-out slaves.
Plutarch argues here as he had in his animal-related
treatises: if one may defend those classes of human
beings who cannot attain to the virtue of a Socrates,
then one must defend animals who are not born to attain
to perfect virtue any more than are those "marginal
classes" of human beings like slaves.
The premises upon which the argument from
marginal cases rests all find expression in Plutarch's
discussion of humankind's relationship to animals: the
idea that animals can to some extent reason and feel;
the idea that such intellectual capacities in animals may
equal or exceed those capacities in some classes of
humans; and the idea that even defective classes of
humans are entitled to some consideration, are clearly
voiced in Plutarch's animal-related treatises. He comes
closest to integrating these premises into a formulation
of the argument from marginal cases in De sollertia
animalium. In the final analysis, it must be admitted
that his statement of the argument is not so succinct as
that of Porphyry, 19 nor does he specify in detail to what
rights either the marginal cases of humans or animals
might in fact be entitIed. 20 Yet Plutarch at least deserves
credit for introducing into Greek speculation about the
nature of humankind's relationship to otIler sentient
beings a form ofargument that continues to be employed
by thinkers who seek to better the lot of animals, and
for developing that argument with tile logical rigor and
compassion that distinguish the best literature of the
modem movement for animal rights.
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Rights and Human Obligations, ed. Tom Regan and Peter
Singer (Englewood Cliffs 1989) 66-72, cites numerous
examples of elaborate use of human sign language by
chimpanzees, and he argues that while non-human primates
have not been shown to speak human languages, they can
understand human words and react appropriately to such
languages through their own mastery of human sign language.
Animal communication is treated at length in Donald R. Griffin,
Animal Minds (Chicago 1992) 154-174, and in Rosemary Rodd,
Biology, Ethics and Animals (Oxford 1992) 74-104.
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4 Daniel A. Dombrowski, "Vegetarianism and the
Argument from Marginal Cases in Porphyry," Journal ofthe
History of Ideas 45 (1984) 141-143, demonstrates that the
argument can be detected in the third century in Porphyry's
De abstinentia (On Abstinencefrom Animal Food). He restates
his arguments substantially in "Porphyry and Vegetarianism:
A Contemporary Philosophical Approach," Aufstieg und
Niedergang der Romischen Welt 2, 36. 2 (1987) 774-777. In
De abstinentia 3. 19, Porphyry argues that all rational humans
who hold that unnecessary suffering ought to be spared all
creatures must base their position on the assumption that those
whose suffering they would remove possess sensation, and
he holds that animals possess sensation as clearly as do human
beings. Some classes of humans possess sensation but do not
possess reason or intellect, but no human would wish to inflict
suffering on them. Since animals can sense pain, is it not
therefore just, Porphyry asks, that we spare them suffering as
we do the defective humans?

7 Plutarch touched upon animal-related issues elsewhere
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superior to animals; in De tuenda sanitate praecepta (Precepts
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refrains from assigning a sole reason for Plutarch's support
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Ancient Medicine? The Reasons for Vegetarianism in
Plutarch's 'Moralia'," Aufstieg und Niedergang der
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toward animal-related issues, see Stephen T. Newmyer,
"Plutarch on Justice Toward Animals: Ancient Insights on a
Modern Debate," Scholia: Natal Studies in Classical
Antiquity, N. S. 1 (1992) 38-54.

t4 On the "governing principle" in Zeno, see von Arnim
1. 143; in Chrysippus, von Arnim 2. 827. The concept of the
"governing principle" and its implications for animal behavior
are well discussed in A. A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy:
Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics (New York 1975) 171-174.
15 The Greek text of the treatises of Plutarch followed in
this study is that of Harold Cherniss and William C. Helmbold,
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16 In the introduction to their translation of De sollertia
animalium, Cherniss and Helmbold 311 note, "There can be
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commentarii derived not merely from Aristotle (mentioned
specifically in 965 D and quoted often), but also from various
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concentrate on isolation of Plutarch's sources are O.
Dickermann, "Some Stock l1lustrations ofAnimal Intelligence
in Greek Psychology," Transactions of the Ame rican
Philological Association 42 (1911) 123-130; V. d'Agostino,
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and Historiography in Honor of Truesdell S. Brown, ed.
Stanley M. Burstein and Louis A. Okin (Lawrence, Kansas
1980) 171-186, while acknowledging his debt to d' Agostino,
argues that Plutarch's deep humanity naturally led him to
sympathy for animal creation.

9In De amore prolis 493B-494A, Plutarch makes a similar
point, arguing that animals are more chaste than are humans
because they engage in sexual intercourse only at specific
times, and then only for the purpose of procreation. Nor do
animals seek to have large families, he notes (493B), for the
tax advantages that such families brought to selfish Romans!
A fascinating study of the literary influence of the treatise
Bruta animalia ratione uti is offered in G. Indelli, "Plutarco,
BrutaAnimalia Ratione Uti: QUalche Riflessione," in Plutarco
e Ie Scienze, ed. I. Gallo (Genoa 1992) 317-352.
10 Plutarch's hostility toward Stoicism has often been
remarked upon by scholars, most especially in Daniel Babut,
Plutarque et Ie Storcisme (Paris 1969), passim. Babut 54
argues that Plutarch's natural sympathy for animal creation
necessarily placed him in opposition to the Stoics. Hubert
Martin, "Plutarch's De Sollertia Animalium 959B-C: The
Discussion of the Encomium on Hunting," American Journal
ofPhilology 100 (1979) 104, argues that a general antipathy
toward Stoicism is joined in De sollertia animalium with an
attack on the Peripatetic view of animals.

It All translations from Greek and Latin authors in this
study are the author's own.
12 The fragments of Chrysippus on the animal soul are
found in Johannes von Amim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta
(Stuttgart 1905; reprinted 1964) 2. 714-716.
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17 The motives that led Empedocles and Pythagoras to
argue against the consumption of animal-derived foods are
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far from agreed upon by scholars. Empedocles seems to have
believed that men during the Golden Age naturally spared
animals because human natures were then more gentle and
amiable; see, for example, Empedocles: The Extant
Fragments, ed. M. R. Wright (New Haven 1981), fragment
119 (Diels-Kranz 130), with Wright's commentary, 284;
more recently, Brad Inwood, The Poem of Empedocles
(Toronto 1992) 60-61, interprets Empedocles' Golden Age
theory and its implications for human behavior toward
animals. In the case of Pythagoras, Tsekourakis 370-379 has
shown that various beliefs contributed to Pythagoras'
opposition to meat-eating, including his belief in metempsychosis and his notion that consumption of meat befouled
the soul. Concern for animals as suffering creatures seems
to have played little part in Pythagoras' doctrine, which sets
him apart from Plutarch.

Chrysippus, whom Plutarch charges (1047B) with saying
anything that occurs to him.
19

See note 4 above.

20 It might be noted that even Tom Regan, "An Examination and Defense of One Argument Concerning Animal Rights,"
passim, while offering an exhaustive defense of the proposition
that animals are entitled to any rights to which marginal cases
of humans are entitled, hesitates to specify what those rights
might be. In The Casefor Animal Rights (Berkeley 1983) 276280, Regan argues that all moral agents and patients possess at
least the right to respectful treatment, a point of view remarkably
similar to that advanced in Plutarch's discussion of Cato's
unfeeling treatment of his slaves and animals. Regan argues
that according respectful treatment to marginal cases of humans
will prevent persons from treating them as if they were receptacles
of value without value of their own, for such a view would allow
one to harm them by causing them suffering. Such behavior is,
in the view of both Plutarch and Regan, morally wrong.

18 Plutarch's treatise De Stoicorum repugnantiis (On Stoic
Self-Contradictions) is a lengthy catalogue of contradictions
detectable in Stoic doctrine, most especially in the works of

Caterpillar
lam born
And then, all at once,
The pale light of spring,
That has hung for my whole life
In the air like winter's breath,
Changes into gold.

And so, even as the last clinging web,
Where I was born with a thousand others
To crawl across a tree,
Floats shining to the ground,
I twirl my silk around and around
Just me
Then sleep, then wake again, born and new.

And the warm hand of the sun,
Through the new leaves,
Falls trembling over me.
And beneath me, beneath the rough bark
I have known forever, the sleeping sap rises
Through the very skeleton of this tree.

Now in the hot sun, my wings
Like petals dry blue and butter
And suddenly, the whole world fills for me
With flowers,
The way the world must fill for you
With those stars you love, that sometimes,
On the darkest nights, step down.

It is then that I feel at my shoulders

An ache
And catch the wish you throw them.

That will pull me into air.

Kathryn Winograd
Littleton, Colorado
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